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Abstract:  We discuss the expansion of Norwegian banks abroad in the post-World War II era.
The Norwegian case gives us an opportunity to examine the determinants of the strategies that
banks from a small county have followed in their international expansion.  At least two issues
emerge as important.  The first issue is the role of regulation as goad and handicap to
internationalization.  Regulations influenced when, where, how and why the Norwegian banks
expanded abroad.  The second issue is the role of the competition and cooperation (including
joint ventures) between banks.
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The International Expansion of the Norwegian Banks
1.0 Introduction
Norwegian banks represent a small part of international banking and
foreign direct investment in banking. Norway is a small country with a
population of only about 4.2 million people; Oslo, the largest city, has less than
half a million people. On a world scale, Norwegian banks too are small. In a
recent (Banker 1997) list of the top 1000 banks in the world, Norway’s largest
bank shows up at position 165. The second and third largest show up at
positions 213 and 306.
We have three reasons for examining the international expansion of
Norway’s banks. What ties these three reasons together is that the Norwegian
case is different in whole or in part from the now well-described US (e.g.
Huertas 1990), UK (Jones 1990) and Japanese cases (Ozawa and Hine 1993).
Wilkins (1990) provides a compact but comprehensive overview for the period
before the first World War.
First, we examine the Norwegian banks and their expansion because
examining such perhaps peripheral cases is an important research tactic. The
first contribution that examining peripheral cases can make is to enhance our
understanding of the dominant case; peripheral cases prove (i.e., test) the rule.
The second contribution that examination of peripheral cases may make can be
to provide directions for revising theory to widen its coverage.3
Second, we examine the Norwegian banks because of the role that domestic
regulation played both in encouraging and in limiting their expansion.
Norwegian governments’ long-standing discomfort with both inward and
outward foreign direct investment in banking had a major effect on the form of
the Norwegian banks’ international expansion. The literature on the role of host
country restrictions in international banking is growing; however the literature
on the role of home country restrictions is still small.
Arguably, regulation is a more important factor in foreign direct investment
(FDI)  in banking than in FDI in manufacturing. As Wilkins (1991) points out, the
legal environment influenced the form and the functions of foreign banks
engaged in business in America from the earliest days. Even so, the literature on
the interaction between regulation and FDI in banking is limited. Typically,
authors have looked at regulation as a barrier to the entry of foreign banks
(Tschoegl 1981, 1985 and 1988) or as a factor in inducing overseas investment
(Poulsen 1986). In a recent article ter Wengel (1995) tested the utility of various
trade theories in explaining international banking. His main finding was that
none of the trade theories was well-supported but that economies of scale were
important; he also found that regulation acted as both a goad to and a constraint
on international expansion.
For the Norwegian banks too, regulations acted both to goad and to
constrain the banks’ internationalization. Domestic legislation also influenced
when, how and where the banks went abroad.4
Lastly, we examine the Norwegian banks because they provide evidence for
another theme that has emerged in the literature on foreign direct investment --
strategic interaction between firms as a factor in foreign direct investment. The
argument dates back at least to Knickerbocker (1973), Flowers (1976) and
Graham (1978) and takes into account the roles of rivalry between and collusion
among firms as factors in the FDI decision. The theoretical work in this area uses
a game-theoretic perspective, modeling the interaction between firms as an
open-ended, repeated game. Graham (1990) provides a model for an exchange of
threat scenario. Veugelers (1995) offers a model that enables one to analyze when
strategic considerations may dominate and possibly counteract the effect of
location and firm-specific motivations for FDI. Recent empirical work includes
Yu and Ito (1988), Terpstra and Yu (1989), Ito and Rose (1994) and Hennart and
Park (1994). Choi et al., (1986 & 1996) incorporate variables designed to measure
strategic interactions in their examination of the factors influencing whether
banks from one financial center establish operations in another center. Engwall
and Wallenstål (1988) address the issue in their examination of the
internationalization of Swedish banks as do Laakso (1984) and Hellman’s (1994)
examinations of the internationalization of Finnish banks.
We divide the paper below into two substantive sections. The first of these
two sections is an historical overview of the evolution of Norway’s banking
sector, and especially of the sector’s international evolution. The section focuses
on the when of the banks’ international expansion. A major issue throughout is5
the role of the home country regulatory environment in the banks’
internationalization.
The second of the two sections examines the (micro) part of the why of the
banks’ international expansion. In particular we detail where the banks went in
following their customers’ business and in seeking business, and the role of
strategic considerations.
2.0 Norwegian banking history
2.1 The period before W.W. II: domestic banking
The three Norwegian commercial banks that make up the bulk of our story
are Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK; est. 1848), Bergens Privatbank (est.
1855) and Den norske Creditbank (DnC; est. 1857). CBK, established in Oslo
where it still has its headquarters, was Norway's first commercial bank. Savings
banks had existed since 1822 but these were community welfare organizations
whereas merchants needed a bank to discount bills (Nordvik 1994). CBK was a
response to the growing demand from the merchant community for short-term
financing but did little until spurred by the founding of DnC (Nordvik 1994).
CBK and DnC (also based in Oslo) catered to customers on the eastern side of the
country. Bergens Privatbank, based in Bergen, served the west coast.
Norway’s banks were only a secondary factor in the building up of
Norwegian society, industry and commerce during this period of political union6
between Norway and Sweden. Knutsen (1991) argues that the structural
characteristics of the Norwegian economy were such that Norway did not need a
strong commercial banking sector. Savings banks, government credit and private
arrangements sufficed.
After Norway became independent in 1905, the banking system continued to
grow but the banks themselves remained small and local. Other than the Den
Norske Handelsbank (Trade Bank of Norway) none developed branches outside
the locality of their incorporation. Furthermore, all concentrated on short-term
lending (Lange 1994a and Knutsen 1994).
Domestic legislation appears to have caused both the decentralization and
the focus on short-term lending. The Storting (Parliament) made branching
difficult in response to local concerns that branch banks would drain funds from
local towns (Knutsen 1991). Until just before World War I, domestic laws
forbade or discouraged private bond issues (Knutsen 1991). Unable to borrow
long, the banks were probably reluctant to lend long. As a result, Norway relied
on foreign sources for long-term funds.
After the dissolution of the union with Sweden, the Norwegians negotiated
their own international loans (Lundström 1991). For their international
transactions the banks operated through a network of correspondent banks that
over the years became quite extensive. Working through correspondent banks
was an easy and convenient way to serve the limited international needs of the
banks' Norwegian customers while avoiding the high costs of establishing7
offices abroad. Foreign exchange business was negligible, but in the interwar
period the banks, particularly DnC, developed an expertise in international
payments.
The Norwegian financial system saw crises in the 1920s and early 1930s. The
banking crisis of 1920 to 1924 resulted in the failure of the Den Norsk
Handelsbank, the largest bank in the country. The Centralbanken for Norge, a
major Norwegian participant in the international loan clubs, also failed
(Johansen 1991).
1 The crisis led to the first legislation providing for public
supervision of the banking system (Knutsen 1994).
In the 1930s many Norwegian banks went bankrupt, as the world financial
crisis reached even this remote corner of the Europe. Thousands of depositors
lost all their savings when the government was unable to bail out all the small
banks that failed. Of the five largest commercial banks only one (CBK) survived
without government help (Lange 1994a). Two went bankrupt. Two (DnC and
Bergens Privatbank) survived liquidity crises and runs by depositors due to a
moratorium supervised by Norges Bank (Knutsen 1994). Altogether, 143 banks
disappeared as independent banking entities during the period 1914 to 1939, and
104 were still in existence in 1939 (Nordvik 1995).
2.2 The '50s and '60s: tentative steps abroad
After the war, with the 1920s and 30s still fresh in their minds, the
Norwegian authorities instituted strict prudential policies. As Cassese (1984) has8
pointed out with respect to Italy, the policies established in response to the crisis
in the 1930s proved to have long lives.
Norway’s official policy after the war was to keep unemployment and
interest rates low. To achieve these goals the government imposed controls on
interest rates. As a result Norway’s credit market was one of the most regulated
in Europe. The government regulations differed by type of institution, further
distorting competition. The interest rate restrictions applied only to the banks
and insurance companies. Other credit institutions (mortgage banks, finance
companies, etc.) could charge market rates.
On the international scene, US companies were expanding at a rapid pace,
and American banks began to establish subsidiaries and branches abroad.
European banks followed suit, though at a slower pace. The emergence of the
Eurodollar market made it increasingly easy to borrow abroad.
At the time, Norwegian banks did little international business. As late as
1957, only 1.2% of the industry's total loans were in currencies other than
Norwegian kroner. Most of the major shipping and industrial companies
borrowed directly from foreign banks rather than going through their
Norwegian banking partners. This was especially true for the shipping industry,
which often had capital needs beyond the scope of the Norwegian banks.
Furthermore, as a prudential measure, the Commercial Bank Law of 1961
required the banks to keep 25% of borrowed money as liquid reserves. In
addition, the banks had to place 40% of their capital in government bonds.9
Consequently Norwegian banks found it difficult to compete with the foreign
banks. The Norwegian banks had to contend both with limitations on the
quantity of funds available for lending and the implicit tax of the required
reserves. Instead, foreign banks became particularly noteworthy suppliers of
credit to Norwegian firms.
The OECD (1970) reported that in 1958-67, by far the largest part of net
capital imports to Norway reflected capital transactions by the private sector.
The shipping sector alone accounted for between two-thirds and four-fifths of
these capital imports. Concern with the balance of payments impact of capital
imports led the Norwegian government to demand that the financing take place
abroad (Den norske Creditbank 1982). This provided one impetus to the
Norwegian banks to develop a capability to borrow and lend in foreign
currencies.
At the same time the Norwegian reserve requirements made it difficult for
the Norwegian commercial banks to borrow abroad (Bjørland 1985). After 1965,
the ratio of loans in foreign exchange to total loans steadily declined at the
Norwegian banks, and the banks began a collective lobbying effort to have the
government reconsider the laws and regulations.
Establishing a foothold in the European Economic Community was also
important to all the major Nordic banks as none of the Nordic countries were
members of the EEC. Many business-people feared that European economic
cooperation would result in a closed capital market. After 1972, when Norway10
voted to reject membership, it became even more important to have a foothold
behind the "wall" that many feared the EEC would build.
The banks’ first destination was Paris because many felt that Paris might
well become Europe's financial center. When it became clear that London, rather
than Paris, was becoming the financial hub of Europe, the Nordic banks
established a major presence there. In time the United Kingdom became "the
country in which Norwegian banks engage in universal banking to the largest
extent" (DnC 1982).
2.3 1970 to 1985: Expansion
In 1971, the Federal Reserve released the US dollar from its previous
connection with the price of gold, which led to instant turbulence in the
international capital markets, and great shifts in exchange rates. The new
exchange rate regime was a major catalyst for the emergence of international
banking if for no other reason than its impetus to the creation of foreign
exchange trading.
The rise in oil prices after 1974 provided a second impetus to the
international expansion of the Norwegian banks. One reason was that the banks
wanted to gain access to the OPEC members surplus funds (Petersen 1982). More
importantly, the Norwegian banks ended up going abroad in order to defend
their position with their domestic clients.11
As oil companies found more and more oil in the North Sea and Norway’s
wealth increased, foreign banks became increasingly aggressive in approaching
Norwegian firms. The foreign banks sought to serve the firms' domestic business
as well as their foreign business. Ongena and Smith’s (1997) data shows that in
1979, companies quoted on the Oslo Stock Exchange listed Chemical Bank (US),
Hambros Bank (UK) and Lazard Bros. (UK), as well as other foreign banks,
among their most important bank relationships.
The Norwegian government facilitated its banks’ response by expanding a
loophole rather than by lifting its domestic restrictions. The government eased
permission for the banks to establish subsidiaries (but not branches) abroad and
exempted the foreign subsidiaries from the domestic rules.
2 Earlier, the process
for receiving permission to establish a subsidiary abroad had been rather
cumbersome.
In 1973-74, given the official go-ahead, the largest Norwegian banks (CBK,
Andressens, DnC and Bergens Privatbank) moved quickly to establish
subsidiaries in Luxembourg.
3 Luxembourg gave the Norwegian banks a base in
Europe and complete freedom regarding international transactions. However,
the subsidiaries in Luxembourg added little to the diversification of the banks’
international portfolio. In 1979, 73% of DnC’s subsidiary’s loans went to
Norwegian customers, with 24% going to the oil industry, 27.5% to shipping,
and 6.8% to the ship yards.12
Also in 1973, the Norwegian government finally authorized foreign banks to
establish representative offices in Norway. The government still forbade foreign
banks to establish branches or subsidiaries. This prohibition limited the
Norwegian banks’ freedom to operate in those markets, such as Japan or New
York State, where the host governments insisted on reciprocity.
Restrictions in the other Nordic countries on entry by foreign banks also
skewed the international expansion of the Norwegian banks. Denmark (until
1971), Finland (1979 and 1982) and Sweden (1986) pursued exclusionary policies
like those of Norway. Barred from the nearest, arguably most logical markets to
enter, the Nordic banks had to go farther afield.
In 1977, the Labor government enacted legislation that allowed the
government to appoint a majority on the banks’ representative councils which
elect the bank boards. In 1982, shareholders regained the right to elect a majority
on the councils and hence regained effective control. The period of de facto
government control was not one of extensive international expansion;
geographic expansion picked up in 1982 and after (Table 1). However we cannot
infer much about the government’s influence from this.
In 1978 and 1980, the government revised the bank law and Norges Bank
relaxed its regulations further. At the end of 1980, the Norwegian commercial
banks reported that they had NOK 19.3 billion in assets in overseas banks
(Norwegian Commercial Banks 1981). This amounted to about 21% of the banks’
total assets in Norway. The geographical breakdown was: 53% in Luxembourg;13
31% in London; 9% in Switzerland; and 7% in the USA, France and the
Netherlands. In terms of the parent bank ownership of the foreign assets, the
breakdown was: 45% DnC; 29% BB; 15% CBK; 14% Forretningsbanken; 9.5%
Bøndernes; and 6% Fellesbanken.
Geographically, in terms of the weight of their expansion, the Norwegian
banks expanded first to Europe, then to America and lastly to Asia (Table 2).
From 1975 to 1990, Europe always accounted for the bulk of the banks’ activities.
2.4 1985-1990: Deregulation
The most important change in the Norwegian banking laws occurred in 1984
when the government substantially deregulated banking. The government
removed the prohibition against Norwegian banks establishing branches abroad.
Within four years Norwegian banks had thirteen foreign branches. However a
number of these, for instance in London and New York, complemented or
replaced existing operations.
Norway also finally permitted foreign banks to establish de novo subsidiaries
(but not branches) in Norway. Seven foreign banks entered immediately in 1985;
the number peaked at nine before falling back to the current five (Tschoegl
1996).
At least one study (Berg et al., 1992) suggests that deregulation may have
brought efficiency gains to the domestic market. Productivity appeared to
regress prior to deregulation and Berg et al. argue that this may have been due to14
the banks preparing for an expansion in their activities. The reduction in the
range of productivity after deregulation appeared to have been the result of the
larger banks reducing the gap vis-à-vis the banks in the smallest quartile. Several
domestic banks merged and several new domestic banks emerged.
Bank deregulation in 1985 led to a doubling of loans outstanding as banks
pursued market share (Lindblom 1994). By 1987, the banks' credit losses had
begun to rise markedly. The government then introduced newer, stricter
accounting standards and forced the banks to set aside large loan-loss
provisions. In the late 1980s, several smaller banks did fail or underwent forced
mergers. By 1990, the problems engulfed even the largest banks: DnC, Bergen
Bank, CBK and Fokus.
2.5 1990 and beyond: failure and reorganization
The banking crisis in Norway was part of a worldwide phenomenon of
financial system problems associated with deflation of real estate values
(Bartholomew 1994; Ball 1994). Koskenkylä (1994) reports that the crisis in
Norway peaked a year or so before that in the other Nordic countries.
Furthermore, loan losses were more severe in Norway than in Denmark and
Finland but less severe than in Sweden. One reason the crisis started earlier in
Norway was the fall in oil prices when the price for Brent (North Sea) crude oil
fell from its peak of over US$35/barrel in 1982 to US$9/barrel at the low point in
1986. Bartholomew (1994) and others suggest that lax supervision and loose15
monetary and fiscal policies also played a role in the severity of the problems in
Norway.
On April 17, 1990, DnC and Bergen Bank, merged under the name Den
norske Bank (DnB). A large restructuring followed in both the bank’s domestic
and international operations (Table 3).
Loan losses continued to mount. Norway's three largest commercial banks,
DnB, CBK and Fokus, were close to collapse. By the end of 1991, the government
owned DnB, CBK and Fokus Bank. It liquidated one smaller bank, Norion Bank,
arranged some mergers and demanded wholesale restructuring of the banks it
owned. At least a third of the banks' staff lost their jobs. Banks closed
headquarters buildings, slashed loan portfolios and sold collateral at fire-sale
prices (Kochan 1995).
After recapitalization, the banks recovered quickly. By 1993 they were
showing solid profits. The main reason was that past provisions for bad loans
proved too have been too cautious as companies started repaying their loans.
Furthermore, the carry-forward of loan losses sheltered profits from taxes. By
January 1995, the government had recouped two-thirds of its initial outlay.
The Norwegian government presently owns 69% of CBK, 73% of DnB and
97.9% of Fokus. In April 1994, the government released a paper on the banking
situation. The government proposed a medium-term goal of retaining a 50%
ownership in DnB and CBK. The government’s long-term goal is to retain a
substantial minority position (20-33.3%). The government does not plan to retain16
any position in Fokus Bank. Fokus Bank does not present the same national
considerations that DnB and CBK present.
Although the Norwegian people again voted not to join the EEC, Norway
became a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 through its
membership in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). One consequence was
that the Ministry of Finance agreed to permit foreign banks based in other EEA
member countries to open branches in Norway. Later, the Ministry extended the
opening to banks from non-EEA countries, providing that the parent countries’
authorities exercised a satisfactory level of supervision.
3.0 Why the Norwegian banks went abroad
Den norske Creditbank (DnC), Bergen Bank (BB), and Christiania Bank og
Kreditkasse (CBK) have been responsible for most of the international expansion
by Norwegian banks (Table 2). In 1990, DnB (DnC+BB) accounted for 49% of
Norwegian banks’ foreign assets; CBK accounted for 39%. Sparebanken NOR
accounted for 12%.
Then DnC and BB (now DnB) and CBK are the most important banks for
Norwegian corporations. For most of the 1970 to 1990 period, the three ranked 1,
3 and 2 in terms of total assets. As Table 4 shows, these banks accounted for
about three-quarters of all the bank relationships reported by the banks listed on
the Oslo Stock Exchange. It is not surprising then that the Norwegian banks'
main motivation for going abroad was to follow their principal Norwegian17
industrial customers, especially in shipping and later oil (Flatraaker and
Husevåg 1991).
In this, the Norwegian banks behaved like their colleagues in the other
Nordic countries. For Danish, Finnish and Swedish banks, Vastrup (1983),
Laakso (1984) and Engwall and Wallenstål (1988) too argue that the primary
motive for going abroad was to follow their customers. With respect to the
Finnish banks, Hellman 1994) contests the point. Hellman suggests that the
Finnish banks went to international financial centers seeking business rather
than following their customers. However neither motive precludes the other.
The Norwegian banks did more than follow their customers. They also
sought new business and took into account the behavior of their domestic
competitors.
3.1 Business following
As Kindleberger (1983) points out, banks have been following their
customers’ business abroad throughout European history. In following the
business, the foreign banks may establish in a foreign location before or after
their clients. Heinkel and Levi (1992) report that the establishment by foreign
banks of branches in a location is highly correlated with exports to the foreign
location from the banks’ home countries. To the degree that exports precede FDI,
the foreign banks may precede some clients while following others.18
In reviewing its own operations, DnC (1982) reported that its moves abroad
took place in three phases. First, DnC guaranteed loans in the foreign location
for the bank's Norwegian customers. Second, DnC itself borrowed and lent to its
customers in foreign exchange. The third and last step was to establish a joint
venture or subsidiary when the volume of business warranted an organizational
presence in the market.
Because the banks’ customers operated in different sectors that had their
own geographical imperatives, the banks ended up opening offices on every
continent. The four most important corporate sectors for the banks were (in
temporal order) lumber (including paper and pulp), shipping, oil, and fisheries.
The needs of Norway’s tourists and retirees represented a fifth sector.
Lumber, paper and pulp: A customer in this industry led DnC to open its
first representative office in São Paulo, Brazil. As its representative DnC chose
Mr. Arne Visser, a Norwegian with extensive local business experience.
The large Norwegian company Borregaard A/S had opened a factory in Rio
Grande do Sul in Brazil to produce unbleached cellulose and needed financing
and bank assistance. Though Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK) had
traditionally been Borregaard's bank, CBK, ever cautious, was reluctant to
pursue something in this unknown market. DnC heard about the project through
its membership in ADELA and seized the opportunity.
4
This became the start of a long and profitable Brazilian involvement for
DnC. Although Borregaard later decided to abandon the project, DnC stayed19
due to the business created by Mr. Erling Lorentzen who had large commercial
interests in Brazil.
5 Lorentzen’s Aracruz Cellulose project, with a yearly
production of 400,000 tons of unbleached cellulose, was a profitable investment,
and well worth financing.
6 DnC also invested heavily in the Lorentzen group.
7
Eventually CBK opened representative offices in São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro that it has since closed. The Rio de Janeiro office supported the wood-
processing industry.
Shipping: In going to London, DnC also held high hopes for the potential
shipping business. London was an international shipping center (insurance,
financing, chartering, brokering), and many Norwegian and foreign shipping
companies operated from London. The success of DNC’s consortium bank,
Nordic Bank Ltd., justified these hopes and eventually DnC acquired all the
shares of Nordic Bank, together with the operations in Singapore and Hong
Kong. Bergen Bank too operated through a consortium bank in London but also
established a subsidiary in Singapore to handle its clients’ shipping business
there. CBK opened representative offices in Sydney and Frankfurt especially to
support its shipping clients.
Oil: After the first oil shock, DnC tried to build part of its expansion around
the oil industry. In the Middle East, DnC established offices in Abu Dhabi and
Dubai (1974) to tap the large capital sources created by rising oil prices. DnC
wanted to open a subsidiary in Dubai and had taken the preliminary steps to
buy a local bank when the authorities proclaimed that the area was20
"overbanked." DnC then abandoned its plans. As part of its strategy to serve the
oil industry strategy, DnC later opened offices in Houston and Denver though it
later closed the Denver office.
Fisheries: CBK opened representative offices in Tokyo and Seattle to serve
the Norwegian fishing fleet. Eventually CBK upgraded the Seattle office to a
branch that it is now closing. In 1994, CBK sold a third of its Seattle loan
portfolio to the Trust Company of the West and is trying to sell the remaining
part as quickly as possible. Losses for 1994 on CBK's loans to the international
fishing industry totaled NOK 360 million. Even with the write-offs, the bank
acknowledges that the portfolio remains a problem (CBK 1994; p.l3).
Tourism: Fokus Bank opened a representative office in Marbella and CBK
opened a representative office in Fuengirola through its Luxembourg subsidiary.
Both of the offices in Spain exist to serve Norwegian tourists and retirees and
thus represent a form of ethnic banking.
General business: Two countries where Norwegian banks could not follow
their customers were Finland and Sweden. Finland was closed to foreign banks,
in effect, until 1982; Sweden was closed until 1986. Gjester (1984) reports that
there were around thirty Norwegian-owned companies operating in Finland,
and 140 Norwegian-owned companies with a total turnover of around
Nkr3.5Bn. Explicit or implicit undertakings in alliances with other Nordic banks
caused the major Norwegian banks to abstain from FDI in other Nordic
countries for some years after the demise of the restrictions. By the early 1990s,21
all external or self-imposed constraints on cross-border investment had
evaporated.
After Norway’s citizenry voted in 1994 to remain out of the European Union,
CBK announced that it would open branches in Denmark and Sweden. CBK’s
rationale is to follow its customers who are now relocating there. As of mid-1996,
CBK had a representative office in Copenhagen and a branch in Stockholm. DnB
now has a subsidiary in Stockholm.
3.2 Business seeking
As the banks began expanding abroad, a new element entered the
discussion. Leading bankers began to assert that the banks should no longer tie
their international expansion exclusively to that of their Norwegian clients. In
1969, the then CEO of DnC, Johan Melander, said in a speech, "I will claim that
in principle it must be a natural thing that one does banking -- the same way as
any other type of business -- wherever it is profitable, whether it is in Europe,
the USA, Africa or Asia" (Melander 1978). Thus the Norwegian banks began to
seek access to markets that appeared to offer greater growth potential than the
domestic market.
For instance, in Asia, DnC opened representative offices in Beijing and
Osaka to build its presence in these emerging financial markets. The bank stated
that it had no intention of establishing subsidiaries in these markets as the
amount of business done by Norwegian companies in the area was fairly small.22
However, even if DnC had wanted to establish subsidiaries, it could not have
done so.
Both the PRC and Japan prohibit the establishment of subsidiaries and until
1985 Norway forbade its banks to open branches abroad. Furthermore, Japan
requires reciprocity; Norway was closed to subsidiaries of foreign banks until
1985 and branches until 1994.
The Norwegian banks, like banks from other countries (Cho et al., 1987) used
representative offices as an easy and cheap way to get a feel for individual
foreign markets and their potential. A representative office required only a small
staff (a representative, who might well not even be a full-time employee, and
one or two clerical employees) and an office. In many cases the representative
office represented not just the Norwegian bank but also worked on behalf of one
or more of the other Nordic banks with which its parent bank cooperated
elsewhere. For instance, when CBK opened its first representative offices in New
York the American who headed the New York office also represented Sveriges
Kreditbank and Den Dansk Landmandsbank.
In DnC's (1982) words, the task of the representative offices was "to maintain
contact with the banks in the area, and find possible business for [the bank’s]
customers. The offices were to inform about the services the bank offered, as
well as receive and guide customers who came to visit." The parent bank could
use the experience of the representative office to discover whether the market
was big enough to warrant establishing a subsidiary.23
Johan Melander, the CEO of DnC during the 1970s, stated in a speech
(Melander 1978) that
"the representative offices are, as one might notice, placed in Latin-
America, the Middle East, and the South-East area of Asia, including
Japan. This has been done because one finds that it is particularly in these
areas that Norwegian businesses should have the greatest potential for
growth, of course in addition to the main areas of Western Europe and
North America. It is the task of DnC to serve its customers while obtaining
as good of an understanding as possible of these parts of the world."
The Norwegian banks appear to have tried many experiments only to curtail
most. We do not know how typical of international banks their strategy and
experience was. Tschoegl’s (1982) study of foreign banks in California and Japan
suggests that exit from markets is rare. However, Tschoegl’s data covers the
1970s, a period when international banking activity was growing rapidly in both
countries. The behavior of the Norwegian banks suggests that the stability that
Tschoegl found is probably due to the attractiveness of the host markets.
Interestingly, the attractiveness did not extend to the Norwegian banks. All the
Norwegian banks that entered either California or Tokyo established no more
than representative offices and left within a few years.
After DnC and Bergen bank merged in 1990, they closed many offices
abroad (Table 3). The consolidation of overlapping operations and the sale of
others resulted in the release of 200 international employees. DnB now has24
branches only in London, New York and Singapore. Each of these three branches
has about 50 employees. Bergen Bank and DnC also merged their Luxembourg
subsidiaries into a successor subsidiary that the new bank still retains.
The closures reflected not just the removal of overlapping operations and
even some financial exigencies but also a sense that the parent banks’ strategies
had been too ambitious. DnC and Bergen Bank had gone into areas (both
geographic and sectoral) that looked interesting but where the banks had no
comparative advantage.
DnB now intends to focus on oil, gas and shipping and the cashflows
between Norway, Germany and Sweden that grow out of these industries.
8 DnB
has announced that it is planning to open branches in Hamburg and Stockholm
in the last quarter of 1995.
When the government took over CBK, it reduced the international division
drastically. Now CBK maintains branches only in London, Singapore, New York
and Seattle. It has also retained its wholly owned-subsidiary in Luxembourg.
CBK's 1994 annual report states, "The goal of the bank's activities abroad is to
supplement the domestic activities, so that CBK's competitiveness towards its
customers which operate abroad can be maintained."
3.3 Strategic behavior
We can describe at least three types of strategic behavior: oligopolistic
reaction (Knickerbocker 1973 and Flowers 1976), exchange of threat (Graham25
1978) and mutual avoidance. With oligopolistic reaction, firms from the same
country see each other as rivals and mimic each other’s investment behavior to
prevent the other from gaining a decisive edge. Engwall and Wallenstål (1988)
and Hellman (1994) argue that the Swedish and Finnish banks exhibited just
such behavior in their international expansion. The empirical problem is
distinguishing oligopolistic reaction from parallel responses to similar situations.
The anecdotal evidence for oligopolistic reaction exists, but one can usually
make the case that each firm in question would have invested in a particular
market even if their competitors had not.
9 Ball and Tschoegl (1982), in one of the
few statistical examinations of the idea in banking, did find that the number of a
bank’s competitors in Japan or California increased the probability that the bank
would itself be in Japan or California, even after they had accounted for other
indicators of market attractiveness. Even so, one could still argue that the
oligopolistic reaction variable was simply picking up factors missed by the
relatively crude control variables.
The same problem exists in the Norwegian case. For example, all three big
banks entered Luxembourg within about two years of each other. However the
triggering event was an exogenous (to each bank) change in government
regulations. Similarly, all three went to London within two years of each other.
Here there was probably no external trigger. Still, at that time London was
emerging as the premier banking center in the world and some 32 other banks
from around the world went there between 1969 and 1971.26
With exchange of threat, rivals in different countries invest in each other’s
home market to prevent the foreign rival from having a sanctuary. Thus a
Swedish bank would establish an office in Oslo and a Norwegian bank would
establish an office in Stockholm. Each would primarily serve its domestic clients’
local needs but each would be aware that if it tried to poach the other’s clients it
would be open to retaliation.
In the Nordic case, the Nordic governments’ ban on inward FDI in banking
until the 1980s, ruled out any exchange of threat. Instead, the Nordic banks
entered into strategic alliances across borders to counter their domestic rivals’
alliances in a pattern that Fenema (1982) describes as “enemies of one’s enemies’
friends.” When the prohibitions on intra-Nordic FDI in banking fell, the alliances
dissolved (Jacobsen and Tschoegl 1997).
Choi et al., (1986 & 1996) find evidence for mutual avoidance in Europe in
the 1980s. However their unit of analysis is the financial center and so they can
say little about relationships between pairs of banks.
The final problem that impedes the documenting of the existence of strategic
behavior is that firms do not have to follow one simple pattern either
diachronically or synchronically over space. The Norwegian banks may well
have met for parallel reasons in some critical centers such as Luxembourg,
London and New York, matched each other in the Far East with some
combination of offices in Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo, and avoided each
other in smaller markets.27
4.0 Conclusion
Regulation played a major role in the expansion of the Norwegian banks.
The desire to continue to serve their customers’ international needs, especially in
the face of competition from foreign banks, spurred the Norwegian banks to go
abroad to avoid the constricting effect of domestic regulations. Regulations
limited the Norwegian banks in terms of both the forms of their international
expansion, and occasionally the locations to which they could go. Lastly, by
blocking all foreign banks from the domestic markets, regulation may have
facilitated cooperation between the Nordic banks.
The Norwegian banks went abroad in the post-war era to serve their
customers, particularly in the lumber and pulp, shipping, oil, and fishing
industries. In time the banks came to participate in the international wholesale
markets, especially in the area of foreign exchange. Retail banking, except for
some minor ventures for retirees in Spain, was not a factor. The pattern of the
internationalization of the Norwegian banks over time, geography, and form
was like that of most of the other major Nordic banks.
In going abroad, it is clear that all the banks engaged in many experiments.
Not only did the Norwegian banks experiment with the form of expansion (joint
or solo) but also with location. All the Norwegian banks exhibit numerous
instances of short-lived ventures, especially representative offices opened and
closed within a few years or even less than a year. This is consistent with Kogut’s28
(1983) view of foreign direct investment as a process of the sequential exercise of
options to invest. Frequently the Norwegian banks withdrew, i.e., they let the
option expire unused.
Clearly, the Norwegian banking industry has undergone some major
changes in the last three decades. The bank crisis of 1991 forced the banks to
curtail their international activities and to trim back the expansion of the 1970s
and early 1980s. With the failure and reorganization behind them, the banks are
carefully beginning to rebuild their presence abroad. They are concentrating on
well-known markets with a solid, existing customer base of Norwegian
companies doing business in the area.
One issue for future research that the case of the Norwegian banks raises is
that of one element of corporate culture -- temperament. By analogy to human
temperament what we mean is a tendency to caution or to adventure. DnC, BB
and CBK all faced objectively similar situations after World War II. All three
were the major banks for corporate customers and in 1979, DnC and CBK at least
had the same number of relationships with quoted companies. Still DnC and BB
followed a more aggressive policy on international expansion than did CBK.
CBK was even, at least at first, willing to loose a customer to its competitors
rather than go abroad to a far away, exotic place such as Brazil. DnC and BB on
the one hand and CBK on the other not only differed in their willingness to go
abroad, but also in their willingness to ally with other Nordic banks to do so.
The question then is, can we meaningfully speak of a firm’s temperament?29
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Endnotes
                                               
1 The Central Bank for Norway was not Norway’s central bank. Norway’s
central bank is Norges Bank, the Bank of Norway.
2 Because subsidiaries are separate legal persons with limited liability, their
bankruptcy does not imperil the parent. A branch is an integral part of the
parent and its liabilities are the parent’s liabilities.
3 In 1975, Bergens Privatbank merged with Bergens Kreditbank to form Bergen
Bank. CBK acquired Andressens Bank in 1979.
4 In 1964 some 226 banks, companies and other institutions from 23 countries
established the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America
(ADELA) to provide long-term development financing. Loan losses forced a
reorganization in 1981.30
                                                                                                                                           
5 Interview with Mr. Tor Hestvik, District Manager for DnB, Haugesund, on
January 12, 1995.
6 The total market value of the company has increased from US$500 million to
US$2 billion in the last ten years. The company has been listed on NYSE since
1992.
7 Totaling NOK 300 million by 1995. Recently DnB announced that it intends to
sell its interests in the company, despite the positive development of the
Brazilian cellulose industry over the last few years. Reportedly DnB believes that
the investment is not part of its primary competencies (Strømen 1995).
8 Conversation with Bjørn Erik Lippestad of Den norske Bank.
99 The second author of this paper can attest from personal experience and
interviews with bankers that bankers from countries with two or three leading
banks are very aware of their competitors actions and frequently ask the
question, “What is ______ doing?” One reference pair that the author is familiar
with is the Dutch banks, ABN-AMRO and ING Bank. A reference triad is Credit
Suisse, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Union Bank of Switzerland.Bibliography
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Table 1
The Number of Employees in Norwegian Bank Branches and Subsidiaries
1975 1980 1985 1990
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Europe 97 100 180 88 479 59 433 62
Americas 25 12 148 19 132 19
Asia 180 22 128 19
TOTAL 97 205 807 693
Source: Flatraaker and Husevåg (1991)39
Table 2: The Evolution of the Norwegian Banks’ Presence Abroad
Representative Office, Branch or Subsidiary Consortium
1
st entry Location DnC BB DnB CBK Other DnC BB CBK Other
1958 Zurich 1964 1958 1958&69 1958(d)
1964 Geneva 1964
1967    Paris 1985 1986 (b) 1967 1968
   São Paulo 1967 1972 1980
1969 Amsterdam 1969
London 1969 1974 1984 (f) 1971 1969 1982
1986 (b)
1979?(a)
1970    Singapore 1970 1980 1970 1983
1972    Abu Dhabi 1972
1973    Tokyo 1978 1973 1986




1974    New York 1988 1981 1981 1974 1983 (a) 1979 1980
   Dubai 1974
1976    Hong Kong 1976 1980 1976 1982
1977    Cairo 1977 1977
1979    Houston 1979 1979 1979 1982
   Sydney 1979
   Dusseldorf 1979 1979
1980    Rio de Janeiro 1987 1987 1980
1981    Stockholm 1985 1995 1981 1984 (a)
1982    Beijing 1982 1985 1982 1984
   Denver 1982
   Osaka 1982
   Monaco 1982
1983    Sundsvall 1983 (c)
   Sydney 1983
1984 Chicago 1984
   Copenhagen 1986 1986 1984 (a)
   Frankfurt 1988 1988 1988 1984
   Hamburg 1984 1984 1995 1984
   Helsinki 1985 1984 (a)
   Los Angeles 1984
   Rotterdam 1984
   Madrid 1984
1985    Gothenborg 1985 1986
   Mexico City 1985 1985
1986    Moscow 1986 1986
1987    Birmingham 1987
Cayman Islands 1987 1988 1987
   San Francisco 1987
Seattle 1987
1988 Marbella 1988 (b)
1990    Berlin 1990
   Budapest 1990
   Mexico City 1990
   Prague 1990
   Warsaw 1990
Fuengirola 1990
a) Sparebanken NOR b) Fokus Bank c) Forretningsbanken
d) Fellesbanken e) Bondernes f) Joint: Sunnmorsbanken & Vestlandsbanken
g) Andresens h) Nordlandsbanken Bold = continuing presence
Italics = presence inherited from DnC, BB directly or from consortia in which they were members.40
Table 3
The merger and subsequent failure caused a substantial shrinkage in DnC, Bergen Bank and
then DnB’s international network
Location DnC Bergen Bank DnB
Europe
Amsterdam Subsidiary *
Berlin Rep office #
Budapest Rep office #
Copenhagen Rep office Rep office**
Frankfurt Subsidiary *
Rep office Rep office
Gothenburg Subsidiary *
Rep office Rep office Rep office**
Hamburg Rep office * Rep office; Branch in 1995
Helsinki Rep office Rep office**
London Subsidiary Subsidiary * Subsidiary
Branch Branch
Luxembourg Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary
Moscow Rep office Rep office
Prague Rep office #
Stockholm Rep office Rep office**; Branch 1995
Warsaw Rep office #
The United States
Delaware Branch *
Houston Rep office Rep office Rep office
Los Angeles Rep office *
New York Branch Branch Branch
Subsidiary? Subsidiary?
Asia
Beijing Rep office Rep office Rep office
Hong Kong Subsidiary *
Branch *
Rep office Rep office Rep office**
Osaka Rep office *
Singapore Branch Branch
Subsidiary Subsidiary
Tokyo Rep office * Rep office *
Africa
Cairo Rep office Rep office
South America
Cayman Islands Branch Branch Branch?
Mexico City Rep office Rep office?
Rio de Janeiro Rep office Rep office?
* = closed or sold in 1990
** = closed since 1990
# = opened in 1990 together with SBP partners
bold= open today, wholly owned by DnB41
Table 4
Den norsk Creditbank, Bergen Bank (later Den norsk Bank) and Christiania
Bank og Kreditkasse account for about three-quarters of all bank
relationships of Norwegian listed companies.
1979 1984 1989 1994
Bank No. % No. % No. % No. %
DnC 44 29 51 28
BB 24 16 36 20
DnB 52 42 65 44
CBK 42 28 51 28 46 37 47 32
Foreign banks 24 16 14 9 6 5 9 6
All others 19 12 29 16 19 15 26 18
TOTAL 153 100 154 100 123 100 147 100
Source: Ongena and Smith (1997)